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DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BARGE OWNERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN SUIT SEEKING DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS AS A RESULT OF
BARGE BLOCKING THE INTAKE CHANNEL OF A HYDROELECTRIC FACILITY
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an order of the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant barge owner, fmding that the entry of
Defendants' barge into a hydroelectric facility caused physical damage to Plaintiff's property and
invasion of its proprietary interest

Catalyst Old River Hydroelectric Limited Partnership v. Ingram Barge Co.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
639 F.3d 207
(Decided April 15, 2011)
Plaintiff, Catalyst Old River Hydroelectric Limited Partnership ("Catalyst"), owns and operates a
hydroelectric station on a privately owned channel from the Mississippi River. Plaintiff sued the
Defendants, American River Transportation Co. ("ARTCO") and Ingram Barge Co. ("Ingram"), for
damages arising as a result of a collision between Defendants' barge drifting into the intake channel of
Catalyst's facility and becoming grounded on the bank of the intake channel, lodged against the station
and abutment. The physical presence of the barge obstructed the intake channel, which provides water
to the turbines of the facility. The presence of the barge forced Catalyst to reduce its output of
electricity in order to prevent the barge from sinking and to allow safe access to the barge for its
removal. Catalyst shut down six turbines and reduced the remaining two to minimum power. Catalyst
restarted the dormant turbines and restored the other turbines to normal capacity approximately 18 hours
later.
Catalyst, seeking damages for the value of power it could not generate as a result of the
blockage, brought suit in Louisiana state court. The Defendants removed the case to the United States
District _ Court of the Western District of Louisiana. The Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of all claims. The district court entered summary judgment against the
plaintiff, finding the entry of the barge into the hydroelectric facility's intake channel did not satisfy the
damage requirement of Louisiana ex. Rei. Guste v. MIV Testabank,1 preventing Catalyst from recovering
its economic losses. In Testabank, the Fifth Circuit set forth that "there can be no recovery of economic
loss absent physical injury to a proprietary interest."2 This parallels the general maritime law that there
can be no recovery for economic loss unless there is physical damage to, or an invasion of, a proprietary
interest.3
The Defendants argued that Catalyst did not suffer physical harm, relying upon Reserve Mooring
4
v. American Commercial Barge Line.
The Court of Appeals rejected this comparison, stating that the
Plaintiffs claim in this case is "markedly different [from that in Reserve] as [Catalyst] argues that the
presence of the barge "impair[ed] the ability of the facility to operate as designed."5 The Court agreed
with Catalyst's view that such harm qualifies as damage to its proprietary interest, stating that "by
interfering with the flow of water, Catalyst's proprietary interest in its facility was invaded and
·

1 752 F.2d 1 0 1 9 (5th Cir. 1 985).
2 Catalyst Old River Hydroelectric Ltd. P'ship v. Ingram Barge Co., 639 F.3d 207, 21 1 (5th Cir. 201 1 ) (citing Testabank, 752
F.2d at 1 024).
3 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1 927).
4 251 F.3d 1 069 (5th Cir. 2001 ) (denying claim for economic damages where company sued for the loss of use of mooring
where a sunk barge interfered with ability of other vessels to moor at facility).
5 Catalyst, 639 F .3d at 2 1 1 .
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harmed." 6 Furthermore, the Court stated that "simply because the physical damage to . . . Catalyst's
facility has been repaired by removal of the barge without cost to Catalyst does not mean that no
physical damage occurred by the intrusion."7 In reaching its decision the Court relied on Consolidated
8
Aluminum Corp. v. Bean Corp. , where the Fifth Circuit held, "harm resulting from the interruption of
the gas supply to [Plaintiff' s] facility satisfied Testabank. "9 Much like the disruption to the flow of gas
in Consolidated, the Catalyst Court found the blockage of water to the Plaintiff s facility also satisfied
Testabank.

The Court further found that Catalyst's voluntary reduction of its turbines, to prevent additional
damage to its facility, may also be used to satisfy the Testabank rule. The Court stated that "[a]cts taken
in mitigation to prevent permanent physical damage can serve as the physical damage requirement in the
10 Without mitigating potential damage, Catalyst would have run the "unacceptable"
Testabank rule."
risk of incurring physical damage to its hydroelectric station. By applying the rule set forth by this
Court in Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v. Zapata GulfMarine Corp. ,11 such reduction of power would
be enough to satisfy the requisite damage requirement, despite the fact that there was no lasting physical
damage to the facility or intake channel after the removal of the barge was completed.
For the above stated reasons the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the judgment of the
district court.
John G. Marek
Class of 2013

UNDER ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ENDORSEMENT POLICIES NAMED AND ANY
ADDITIONAL INSUREDS ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME BENEFITS AND RESTRICTIONS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an order of the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellee, f"mding that the Protection and
Indemnity Clause and the Alternative Employment Endorsement Clause were not conflicting and
thus, SNIC was not awarded reimbursement for their defense costs
Cal-Dive International, Inc. v. Seabright Insurance Company
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

627 F.3d 110
(Decided November 22, 2010)
This case involves an insurance policy coverage dispute. Coastal Catering, LLC ("Coastal") and Horizon
Offshore Contractors, Inc. ("Horizon") entered into a catering services agreement. David Brown, a Coastal
employee, was injured while aboard a Horizon vessel. Brown brought a Jones Act lawsuit, naming Coastal and
Horizon as co-defendants. Under the terms of their business contract, Coastal was obligated to defend Horizon
through plaintiff-appellee State National Insurance Company ("SNIC"), its Maritime General Liability ("MGL")
insurer. Coastal defended itself through defendant-appellant Seabright Insurance Company ("Seabright"), its
Maritime Employer's Liability ("MEL") insurer. After the underlying case settled, SNIC and Seabright divided
the defense costs fifty-fifty, and SNIC sought reimbursement.

!d. at 213.
/d. at 214.
8 772 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1985).
9 Catalyst, 639 F.3d at 212-13.
10
!d. at 213 (citing Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co.
11
71 F.3d 198.
6

7

v.

Zapata GulfMarine Corp. , 71 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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